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Why Does Language Complexity
Resist Measurement?
John E. Joseph*
University of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Insofar as linguists operate with a conception of languages as closed and self-contained
systems, there should be no obstacle to comparing those systems in terms of simplicity
and complexity. Even if complexity ‘trade-offs’ between sub-systems of phonology,
morphology and syntax are considered, it ought to be relatively straightforward to
quantify constitutive elements and rules, and assign each language system its place on
a complexity scale. In practice, however, such attempts have turned up a series of
problems and paradoxes, which can be seen in work by Peter Trudgill and Johanna
Nichols; the latter has proposed an alternative means of measuring complexity which
presents new problems of its own. This paper makes the case that overcoming the
difficulty of measuring simplicity and complexity requires confronting the normative and
interpretative judgments that enter into how language systems are conceived, identified
and analysed.
Keywords: language complexity, language simplicity, inventory and descriptive complexity, normativity, language
structure, constitutive and regulative rules
INTRODUCTION
Linguistic simplicity and complexity have been the site of such profound scepticism over such a long
period that one has to admire the defiant persistence of those who pursue its investigation. Their
work generally shows a keen awareness of the conceptual and methodological difficulties which the
question represents, and a determination to get on with their research despite the various ways in
which language complexity resists measurement.
Sometimes, intentionally or not, these researchers subtly signal their own scepticism. A case in
point is when Nichols (2019) examines how the presence of grammatical gender in a language
apparently correlates with a high overall level of systemic complexity. Although Nichols applies the
commonly used method of ‘inventory complexity’, based on the number of elements in the system
and of rules applied to them, she cautions that this
is not a very accurate or satisfactory measure of complexity, not least because it does not
measure non-transparency, which is the kind of complexity that has been shown to be
shaped by sociolinguistics (Trudgill, 2011); but it is straightforward to calculate (though
data gathering can be laborious), and appears to correlate reasonably well with other, better
measures. (Nichols, 2019: 64)
By ‘non-transparency’ Nichols means the degree to which an element falls short of an idealised
situation (transparency) in which one form maps to one and only one meaning, and vice-versa. Two
languages with the same number of elements and rules will be assessed as having identical inventory
complexity, when in fact, if one has more transparency than the other, it is less complex.
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Trudgill repeatedly cites the Latin ablative plural inflection -ibus
(as in hominibus ‘from the men’) as lacking transparency, because
it cannot be divided into a plural morpheme and an ablative
morpheme, and moreover it is identical to the dative plural form
(hominibus ‘to the men’). This makes it more complex than its
Turkish equivalent adamlardan ‘from the men’, which segments
transparently into adam ‘man’, lar (plural) and dan (ablative)
(Trudgill, 2011: 92). Yet an inventory complexity analysis would
say that Turkish is the more complex language, having more
inflectional morphemes. Inventory analysis is focussed on forms
rather than meaning, and misses the complexity which inheres in
the form-meaning relationship.
Nichols however continues to use inventory analysis for
practical reasons (‘straightforward to calculate’), supplementing
it with what she calls ‘descriptive complexity’, the amount of
information required to describe a system.1 This has the reverse
strengths and weaknesses of the inventory measure, being more
resistant to quantification but able to accommodate a much wider
range of complexifying factors. As an example, her inventory




Russian 5 3, plus animacy
The descriptive complexity analysis is based on what is
required for ‘a descriptively and theoretically adequate
synchronic grammar’, and is as follows:
Mongolian noun paradigms: Display 1 paradigm, plus 1
extended; Access phonological information.
Russian noun paradigms: Display 5 paradigms, plus
extended (2 extension allomorphs); Access
phonological information; Comment on syncretisms,
allomorphy, etc.
By the inventory measure it would appear that Russian noun
paradigms are 8 times more complex than Mongolian ones.
Nichols does not venture a numerical figure for the descriptive
measure, the point of which may simply be to reassure anyone
sceptical about inventory measurement that both methods show
Russian to be considerably more complex. Nichols’s inclusion of
descriptive complexity implies, or at least implicitly
acknowledges, scepticism about the more standard inventory
complexity, whilst offering evidence that its flaws do not
cancel or outweigh what it reveals. It is simultaneously a
critical and a defensive moment.
Such moments, when analysts raise a criticism of their own
methodology, then proceed to dismantle or contain the criticism,
offer valuable insight into what the practitioners understand their
analysis to be doing. Because it is themselves and not colleagues
who are under their critical gaze, they omit the usual gestures of
courteous deference and get straight to the point; they lower their
guard, relax the authoritative scientific voice and let us hear
echoes of the debate transpiring in their own mind. I have opened
with this look at Nichols’s alternative form of measurement in
order to establish that I am not launching a critique, but looking
at how the people directly invested in this scientific enterprise are
struggling with basic matters of how it is conducted and what it
purports to show. I want to suggest that it is worth considering
whether the issues may be linked to developments in other areas
of linguistics, historical and contemporary.
Within research on linguistic complexity we find a continuum
with, at one end, work of a deeply quantitative nature, aimed at
developing a precise scale of complexity; in the centre, work that
is quantitative but cautious about precise measures because of the
obstacles to obtaining them; and at the other end, work that does
not try to establish numerical measures, only descriptive ones.2 I
shall focus on the second two, as represented at their best in the
work of Nichols and Trudgill respectively. Nichols, despite her
caution, takes on the quantitative burden sufficiently that
whatever methodological conclusions I may deduce from her
work can be taken to apply a fortiori to more gung-ho
quantitative researchers.
I shall also look at what precisely the quantitative measures are
weighing up, which are never raw production data, but the
generalised results of analysis, in the form of phonologies,
grammars, lexicons and other sub-systems, and ultimately the
language system as a whole. This involves selecting certain
manifestations of the language for examination, and leaving
others aside; and then applying certain ways of analysing a
language system, whilst again ignoring others. There is no
universally accepted analytical format, and indeed we
sometimes find the same linguists applying different types of
analysis at different stages of their career. It will become clear that
analysis involves normative judgments at numerous levels on the
linguist’s part, judgments which the field’s methodological
doctrine requires to be hidden and denied. It is this covert
normative content that, I shall argue, keeps the complexity of
languages from being readily measured and compared.
EXPERIENCING COMPLEXITY
Structurally, there is no reason in principle why one language
should not be more complex than another, in whole or in part.
The existence or non-existence of a feature such as gender
inflection of inanimate nouns and the adjectives which modify
them seems like a clear-cut example of relative complexity and
simplicity, as do the larger or smaller phonological inventory
1The two types are implicit in Miestamo’s (2008: 26) statement that ‘complexity
should be defined, to put it in the most general terms, as the number of parts in a
system or the length of its description’.
2Different points on this continuum are occupied by studies that compare a small
number of languages and those that use larger and more ‘ecological’ datasets, and
by those incorporating measures based on entropy or patterns of co-occurrences
along with feature counts. All of these raise significant issues and in some cases call
for mitigations which the limited scope of this article regrettably demands that I
leave aside.
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of a language, the number of its morphophonological rules,
verb tenses and moods, obligatory syntactic permutations and
so on.
On the other hand, what people grow up doing becomes second
nature to them. Whatever language they are accustomed to is
simpler for them than ones they are unaccustomed to, so for
individual speakers of two different languages, their mother
tongues present no degrees of complexity for them on a
psychological or practical level. No language has been shown to
be harder than another for children to learn as their first language; if
children simplify some structures, for instance regularising irregular
verbs in English (I goed rather than I went), it is from the adult point
of view that this constitutes a simplification – implicitly an
oversimplification, when I goed is classed as not ‘correct’ English,
or just not English.3
This throws into question what, if anything, the apparent
differences in structural complexity really mean. They might be
mere artefacts of our structural analysis – except that the
simplicity or complexity of languages is part of the everyday
experience of multilingual people, including students of a second
language (Pallotti, 2014 includes a good summary of work on
‘outsider’ or ‘relative’ complexity). Multilinguals are not some
rare exception that can be ignored, but ‘make up a significant
proportion of the population’ (Bialystok et al., 2012: 240).4 As a
learner of Arabic and various European languages, I find the
gender inflection of nouns and adjectives to be a complexity
relative to the absence of such gender inflection in English.
Cantonese has no inflections, making it seem to me, as a
learner, to offer an altogether simpler structure, though I have
found its system of tones difficult to master. These reactions are
not at all unique to me, but are shared by other learners.
Even monolinguals regularly encounter complexity within
their one language, complexity which has to be ‘translated’
into a simpler form in order to be understood – what linguists
analyse in terms of ‘register’, where it can be unclear whether the
simplicity or complexity is located within what Saussure termed
langue, the system, or parole, use of the system. As Hiltunen (2012:
41) states, ‘Legal syntax is distinctly idiosyncratic in terms of both
the structure and arrangement of the principal sentence elements’.
If you can speak and understand Legal English perfectly, and I can
manage only bits of it, it is not evident that the register in question
is the same langue as I possess, just put to use differently. And
whether we are dealing with one langue or two, the systematic
divergences which I perceive as complexities in ‘legalese’, a lawyer
might argue exist in order to eliminate ambiguity and imprecision,
and hence represent greater simplicity.5 Neither of us is likely to
assert that they are equally simple.
Being part of everyday experience is prima facie evidence that
something is not an illusion or an analytical artefact, but real. The idea
of simpler and more complex language structure has both logic and
common experience on its side. The lack of evidence that any
particular language is harder than any other for mother-tongue
speakers to learn does not prove the equal structural complexity of
languages. It is when linguists set out to measure simplicity and
complexity that problems arise on the conceptual andmethodological
levels. The problems are exacerbated by attempts to explain, elucidate
and interpret them in more general mental and cultural terms, which
leads us into the putative psychology of peoples. Although Joseph and
Newmeyer (2012) conclude that once such interpretations are set aside
it should be possible to conduct sound investigations of linguistic
complexity, that does not eliminate basic methodological and
conceptual obstacles to its measurement.
SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE
Trudgill’s (2011) ‘sociolinguistic typology’ aims to establish
correlations between linguistic complexity and how the
language community is constituted in terms of size, stability,
amount of contact with outsiders, density of social networks and
amounts of communally-shared information. The conditions
which permit complexity to develop are when the community
is relatively small and stable, has little contact with adult
outsiders, and has networks and information contained
enough to produce a ‘society of intimates’. The reverse
conditions favour simplification. Trudgill uses pronoun
systems as an example (2011: 175-8), noting that ‘the small-
group indigenous languages of Australia typically have at least 11
personal pronouns, involving first, second, and third persons;
singular, dual, and plural numbers; and inclusive and exclusive
“we”’ (174), whilst the South African language !Ora has a ‘31-
pronoun system, which distinguishes between male and female
[and additionally has a ‘common gender’] in the first and second
3The difference between not correct English and not English is more problematic
than linguists generally take it to be, and will be discussed in Constitutive and
Regulative Rules. Children sometimes ask ‘Why I went, and not I goed?’, to which
the typical parent will reply ‘That’s just how it is’, whilst expecting that a
professional linguist could provide a better answer. In fact a linguist will say
the equivalent of ‘That’s just how it is’, but at greater length and in a different
register, evoking for instance causal mechanisms or evolutionary trajectories or
simply the term ‘suppletion’. Naming the phenomenon provides a sense that it is
under our control, and can even be taken as the equivalent of explaining it, by
linguists and non-linguists alike. In general, though, the lack of a detailed
explanation for a phenomenon such as suppletion is exceptional. Linguists find
it disturbing, and may trot out the observation that suppletion tends to occur with
high frequency words. This is not exactly an explanation either, but at least points
to something the average non-linguist might not notice.
4Bialystok et al. actually say this about ‘bilinguals’, who are sometimes taken as a
separate category from ‘multilinguals’, though I am using ‘multilingual’ to mean
anyone who is not monolingual. Bialystok et al. begin their article by saying that ‘It
is generally believed that more than half of the world’s population is bilingual’,
citing Grosjean (2010) as their authority. There is in fact no reliable measure for or
against the general belief, which additionally depends on the vexed matter of what
gets counted as the same or different languages.
5A parallel argument is put forward in Morris (1938 [1971]: 26), the founding
document of pragmatics, with regard to the ‘special and restricted languages’ of the
sciences and the arts, as opposed to ‘universal’ languages (‘English, French,
German, etc.’ as used in non-specialist contexts). In the latter, ‘it is often very
difficult to know within which dimension a certain sign is predominantly
functioning, and the various levels of symbolic reference are not clearly
indicated. Such languages are therefore ambiguous and give rise to explicit
contradictions’.
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as well as third persons, which has dual number, and which
contrasts exclusive and inclusive “we”’ (175).6 He remarks that
This contrasts dramatically with, say, the simple 8-











It is noteworthy that he specifies ‘Standard English’, as he gives the
most minimal inventory of pronouns in order to make the contrast
with !Ora as stark as possible. In much of the English-speaking world
there is a second-person plural form: you all or y’all, you lot, you guys
or yous guys, you ones or you’uns or yinz, and still other variants, all
understandable to speakers of English including those who do not use
them, and therefore part of their ‘grammar’. That is also the case with
thou and ye, used by vast numbers of English speakers in specific
contexts, and by smaller numbers in particular dialects. If y’all is
classified as a plural, it is hard to justify not labelling you two a dual –
and in fact both we and you can be followed by a specifying numeral
without limit. Linguists would not generally classify these as distinct
forms; butwhy not?Whatever answermight be given to that question,
for example that they are not morphological forms but syntactic
combinations, involves an analytical judgment resting on where one
sees morphology ending and syntax beginning, when some linguists
deny that any boundary exists between them.
Trudgill ignores the impersonal pronoun one, and more
problematically, its French counterpart on, since in the French case
it cannot be claimed that its use is limited to ‘high’ registers. In fact it is
themost commonfirst-personplural form in spokenFrench, and is also
used for first-person singular reference (as in English), and sometimes
for second-person. The French of many regions has an exclusive form
nous autres ‘we (others)’ (where it is the person addressed who is
excluded), alongside the inclusive nous ‘we’; and a form vous autres ‘you
(others)’ for the second-person plural, alongside vous as the singular
polite form ‘you’ – something left out of Trudgill’s chart entirely, and
which would make the ‘8-person system’ less simple.7
With the third-person pronouns the ‘simple’ system is in the
throes of complexification. English speakers are experiencing a
grammatical evolution that has been transpiring over several
decades within the third-person singular pronoun system. In an
earlier phase of the language, the masculine singular was also the
generic form; and with reference to a specific person, the choice of
masculine or feminine was made by the speaker, based on the
perceived physical gender of the person referred to. The evolution
has resulted in an augmentation of this system, with several new,
nonbinary pronominal forms having developed, in addition to use of
the plural, sometimes with a singular verb, or of both the masculine
and feminine; and with, in many contexts, speakers expected to use
the preferred pronouns specified by the person referred to.
Earlier system: he/him/his (masc. & gen. sg.); she/her/
hers (fem. sg.); it/its (neut. sg.)
New system: he/him/his (masc. sg.); she/her/hers (fem.
sg.); it/its (neut. sg.); they/them/theirs, zie/zim/zis, sie/
sie/hirs, ey/em/eirs, ve/ver/vers, tey/ter/ters, e/em/ers (all
non-binary, with choice specified by person referred to)
By both of Nichols’s (2019) measures, inventory complexity and
descriptive complexity, the new system is considerably more complex
than the older one. Less clear is whether linguists would accept that the
new system should be taken into consideration in an assessment of the
complexity of English pronouns. The division of labour in linguistics is
such that the new system is considered the business of a sociopolitical
discourse world separate from the structural analysis which is the basis
of complexity measures. Even Trudgill’s sociolinguistic typology does
not try to break down the wall between them: he takes the systems to
be what the grammars say they are, and assesses complexity on the
basis of that alone; then uses social characteristics of the language
community to explain why they are simple or complex. That is
consistent with the dominant view within linguistics: when linguists
see individuals discussing a question of language form such as the use
of non-binary pronouns, that seems ipso facto to disqualify it from the
sort of ‘natural’ development they associate with language structure,
and to make it instead a matter of how the structure is used.
Linguists take language structure to be unconscious. For so long as
speakers other than professional linguists are talking about a structure,
it is suspect: it figures in parole, but not (yet) in langue. The discourse
about non-binary pronouns is not part of natural unconscious
language structure; moreover, if it is not exactly prescriptivist, it
comes close enough, and the first creed of modern linguistics is
that it deals with description rather than prescription. Only when the
pronouns stop being talked about, and are just used, will they be
treated as real by linguists who work with language structure alone,
rather than the social or political dimensions of language. And only
then can measurement commence – at which point further
conceptual and methodological difficulties arise.
To call the new English pronoun systemmore complex is not a
value-free description. There is no more powerful philosophical
and scientific dictum than Occam’s razor.8 Other things being
equal, simplicity is preferable to complexity. Linguists working in
this area (e.g. Miestamo, 2008; Hawkins, 2009) have sometimes
6!Ora, a Khoe-Kwadi language, is called ‘extinct’ by Trudgill. According to Vossen
(2013: 10), !Ora (also known as !Gora, !ora, Korana) is still ‘said to be spoken by just
a handful of persons in South Africa. For a long time it was believed to be extinct’.
7In Quebec French nous autres means just ‘we’, with no exclusivity implied. The
fact that nous autres and vous autres are written as two words (unlike their Spanish
equivalents nosotros and vosotros) likely plays a part in their ‘invisibility’ as distinct
pronominal forms. They frequently appear as a single word in dialect writing.
8The history of Occam’s razor is ironically complex, but William of Occam did
write ‘Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’ (It is futile to do through
more things what can be done through fewer, Summa totius logicae i.12). Ball
(2016) offers an interesting perspective on ‘the tyranny of simple explanations’ in
the history of science.
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stressed that what is complex in one perspective may be simple in
another. To someone fighting a long-term battle against being
boxed into a gender they reject, the evolution of the English
pronoun system may well seem like a simplification: it allows
non-binariness to be expressed with the same structural ease as
binary divisions are. To the eyes of a linguist like Trudgill, if he
were to accept it as part of the language system, it would appear as
a complexification of the system; and it would run counter to his
prediction that complexification will not occur in today’s post-
intimate societies. What the prediction leaves out is that social
intimacy can take new forms – including the online social
‘bubbles’ within which the most recent demands for changes
to the pronoun system have developed and spread.
The changes reduce transparency, in as much as several forms
have been introduced for the same meaning of non-binariness,
but at least as important is the fact is that non-binariness is itself a
meaning that previously was not represented in the system. It was
already there, as a meaning, for large numbers of people, and was
denied linguistic expression by the majority, for whom it was too
complex to have to deal with, even though, conceptually, the unity
of non-binariness is simpler than division into genders.9
Trudgill does not attempt to quantify complexity, and his
statement that !Ora pronouns are more complex than French or
English ones may well stand – one would want to knowmore about
the contexts of use for all the forms before making a definitive
judgment – even after we have drawn aside the curtain and revealed
theWizard of Norwich pulling levers to make the European-African
contrast appear as ‘dramatic’ as possible. If however Nichols were to
turn Trudgill’s statement about !Ora into a calculation that its
pronoun system has 3.88 times the Inventory Complexity of
French and 4.43 times that of English – figures that might even
be increased if reckoned by Descriptive Complexity, since Trudgill
gives no scope for any factor other than person and number for the
French and English pronouns – it should be clear how the numbers
depend directly on the choices made in the analysis.
INVENTORY COMPLEXITY:
MEASUREMENT AND REDUCTION
The levels and categories of linguistic analysis were created with the
aim of identifying order, rather than measuring it. In a sense,
identifying order within a language is a way of simplifying it for
purposes of analysis and understanding: when a set of hundreds of
Latin words is reduced to one root verb and half a dozen
morphological categories (person, number, tense, aspect, mood
etc., which in combination take hundreds of inflectional endings to
express them), that certainly simplifies the picture for the analyst –
who may then assume that this was the mental system of every
ancient Roman speaker of Latin. That is a deductive leap. As Sapir
(1921: 39) famously wrote, ‘All grammars leak’, which is a way of
saying that a grammar can never be more than an approximative
account, and never definitive.When the complexity of grammatical
categories is being compared in two or more languages, the
measurements are taken from two or more approximative
accounts, usually made by different analysts.
For purposes of comparison, the same categories – consonant,
gender, passive, definite etc.– need to be applied in analysing the twoor
more languages. In the best of circumstances, the grammatical accounts
being used will have been drawn up after investigation of whether the
categories are actually the same across the languages, and not assumed
to be the same because of partial overlap and use of the same English
grammatical category (or whatever language the analysis is written in)
to translate them. This is not always the case, and some of the serious
consequences are laid out by Haspelmath (2018) (for an alternative
perspective, see Spike, 2020). Most of the principal analytical categories
that linguists make use of, starting with noun, verb, adjective, adverb,
preposition, sentence, case, tense, mood, number, person, voice,
conjunction, subordination, originated in the analysis of Latin, and
the question is whether they can be applied to any language, barring
compelling evidence to the contrary in specific cases. Already within
Latin, there is ample inscriptional evidence that all Romans did not
speak alike, and that the earliest grammars were not intended to
capture how all Romans spoke, but to devise a systematic schema for
producing and comprehending a somewhat idealised form of the
language,more regular and logical thanwhat one heard in the streets or
read on latrine walls.
When measuring and comparing complexity in Latin and
some other language which has been analysed following the
tradition ultimately deriving from Latin grammars, what is
being compared are usually these somewhat idealised forms.
That would be less problematic if one could ascertain that the
idealisations were reached in the same way, or indeed that a
category such as verb means exactly the same thing in, say,
Latin and Chinese. The particular difficulty in this instance is
that in Latin a verb can usually be identified by its morphology,
whereas in Chinese it cannot, so Chinese verbs are those words
which translate what are identifiable as verbs in languages with
distinct verbal morphology. Every linguistic category presents this
problem between any two languages, and not just unrelated ones,
though perhaps especially with them. Do the categories really mean
the same, do they do the same functional work? Are the functions
of language universal, or culture-specific, or more specific still?
Identifying categories functionally for purposes of measuring
complexity presents further difficulties, and not just with regard to
language. A simple hammer can be made by joining a head to a
handle; it can be complexified by adding a claw, a neck, a grip, or even,
as Homer Simpson discovered, electric power. How would one
measure the degree of complexity which each of these additions
represents? Not by what it can do that a simple hammer cannot,
such as extricating a nail using the claw: that would be some sort of
efficiency measure, not one of complexity. Perhaps by the amount of
additional time it takes to produce the more complex hammer, under
identical conditions. That seems reasonable and methodologically
feasible: assemble a group of hammersmiths, give them the necessary
materials and time their production of hammers of various types. Yet
in reality nearly all hammer heads are made by casting steel, and
producing one with a claw or neck will take the same amount of time
9What is complex is the co-existence of binary and non-binary categories, for those
of us who use both, plus the ethic of respecting the preferred pronouns of the
person referred to. If the system were to develop to a single pronoun set, such as zie/
zim/zis, this would be a simplification by any existing measure.
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and effort once the cast is made. A rubber grip, on the other hand,
requires a direct expense ofmanufacturing time andmaterial, but does
not make the hammer more functionally complex.
When it comes to languages, it does not seem to be the case that
some of them have the structural equivalent of a hammer claw,
making it possible to extract nails from wood, whilst others do not.
In functional terms, whatever can be done using one language can
also be done using any other, even if by different structural means;
more precisely, in scientific terms, it has never been shown that a
particular utterance in language x cannot be translated into
language y. The utterance and its translation may differ in
perceived efficiency of expression or in aesthetic effect, but on
the level of meaning, of ‘message’, what is conveyed in x can be
rendered, expressed, explained in y. This is subject to the proviso
that, even within a single language, meaning is not a matter of a
message being transmitted directly from a speaker’s mind to a
hearer’s; it has to be interpreted by the hearer, which is to say that
the meaning of the utterance is reconstructed, co-constructed.
Long-standing views about the ‘impossibility of translation’ (see
Joseph, 1998) have been dependent on an idealised conception of
meaning transmission, characterised by Reddy (1979) as the
‘conduit metaphor’. In any case, such views have not tended to
differentiate between translation into a closely related, structurally
similar language on the one hand, and a language perceived as
being at a different level of structural complexity on the other.
Moving from particular structural levels to global assessment of
the comparative simplicity and complexity of languages, we
encounter the notion of ‘complexity trade-offs’, whereby for
example a smaller phonemic inventory might be compensated for
by greater word length. This fits in with the approach which treats
the functions fulfilled by languages as universal: the function being
invariable, the complexity of the linguistic means by which it is
carried out should also be invariable in its totality, butmay vary in its
component parts. This was crucial to the doctrine of equal linguistic
complexity which was asserted in a strong form starting in the 1950s,
in part as a reaction against claims of the superiority of some cultures
over others (see Joseph and Newmeyer, 2012). Since at least
Gabelentz (1891) it has been recognised as well that perceived
simplicity in the system for language production (Bequemlichkeit)
does not equate with simplicity of understanding and interpretation
(Deutlichkeit). On the contrary, they seem in at least some instances
to be directly opposed to one another.
These difficulties have led some to reject global assessment of a
language’s complexity in favour of level-specific assessment.
Nevertheless, the conception of the language system which figures
in complexity research is of a closed system (apart from lexicon and
other levels discussed inConstitutive and Regulative Rules below), and
a closed system should in principle be measurable in terms of how
simple or complex it is relative to another closed system.
DESCRIPTIVE COMPLEXITY
Replacing or complementing inventory complexity with descriptive
complexity hasmany advantages, as Nichols (2019) points out, though
she also acknowledges that it is more resistant to precise quantification.
Comparing descriptive complexity across languages obviously requires
that their structures be described in the same way, or as similarly as
possible. Ideally the linguists doing the comparing would be the ones
who collected and analysed the data and wrote up the initial
descriptions; in practice, the linguists doing the comparing tend to
work at least partly with descriptions drawn up by others. Differences
in methodological handling of the data, from collection to analysis to
description, are seldom recoverable, and even when they are, any
attempt to incorporate them into a new description being created for
measurement of descriptive complexity could only be approximative
and might well introduce as much distortion as it eliminates.
It is an old debate within linguistics whether descriptive practice
should aim for observational objectivity or should take account of
how speakers themselves understand (or ‘feel’) how the language is
structured: this is the ‘etic-emic’ debate, a locus classicus for which is
Sapir (1933). It rarely surfaces in work on linguistic complexity,
where the starting point is the completed grammatical analysis.
Scepticism about inventory complexity is based in part on concerns
about the mapping of form and meaning, where something of the
emic critique of etic analysis comes through. Descriptive complexity
alleviates some of these concerns, but by no means all of them.
Differences in descriptive practice hark back to the earliest known
linguistic analyses. The Asṭ̣adhyayi (‘Eight chapters’) of Paṇini is a
reduction of the Sanskrit language to the simplest possible form, in a
logical sense. It consists of 3,959 sutras covering thewhole of Sanskrit
phonology and grammar. The sutras are written in an extremely
compact style, perhaps to aid memorisation and repetition. This
gives them the character of mathematical formulas, which start from
an abstract base form, then use complex rules to derive the actually
occurring forms from it. A sense of its character comes through from
considering just the first two sutras:
1.1.1 vrḍdhiradaic
1.1.2 adeṆgun ̣ah ̣
The first sutra says, in effect: vrḍdhi  a or aic. The word vrḍdhi,
meaning growth or increase, is used to indicate a ‘strengthening’ of
the vowel /a/ under certain conditions. The sutra specifies that, under
vrḍdhi, /a/ can be doubled in length to /a/, or else can become ‘aic’
— the formula for the set consisting of the two diphthongs /ai/ and
/au/. Such a set, called a paribasa, is something one has to know
separately. Knowledge of it is assumed by the sutra.
The second sutra says: a or eṆ guṇa. This defines a lesser grade of
strengthening of a which is termed guṇa. The sutra specifies that,
under gunạ, /a/ can either remain as /a/ or else can become ‘eṆ’ — the
formula for another paribasa, consisting of the long vowels /e/ and /o/
(classed with diphthongs in Sanskrit grammar). Thus the first sutra
can be translated in an expanded form as ‘The term vrḍdhi covers the
sounds /a ai au/’, and the second sutra as ‘The term gunạ covers the
sounds /a e o/’. Economy has so driven the structure of the text as to
make it extraordinarily difficult to follow, indeed impossible except to
adepts. The fact that symbols are used before they are explained is only
one part of this difficulty. Withmany of the sutras, how they are to be
expanded is a vexed question, which is why a long tradition of
commentaries on Paṇini arose.
How does the descriptive complexity of these two sutras compare?
They are of approximately identical length; each requires additional
knowledge which is signalled but not spelled out. They cover the same
number of sounds. On the other hand, the first sutra describes what
for a modern linguist are familiar processes of lengthening and
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diphthongisation, which can be taken as straightforward and requiring
no explanation, just specification of the circumstances under which it
applies. The second sutra describes what to modern eyes is a complex
and intricate relationship of a set of vowels and diphthongs, calling for
elucidation and explanation, in addition to specification of
circumstances; linguists with Indo-Europeanist training will also
want to be told how it relates to the development of these vowels
from Proto-Indo-European to Sanskrit, but that goes beyond the
bounds of ‘description’ – or does it?
Within the context for which these descriptions were created, the
grammatical tradition of the language described, vrḍdhi and gunạ
exhibit equal complexity. Taken out of this ‘native’ context and
translated into descriptions which answer the questions a modern
non-Sanskritist expects to have answered, guṇa is of greater descriptive
complexity. This is in part a version of the etic-emic debate, and in part
an example of the potential disjuncture between the complexity of the
description and that of the phenomenon described.
Even when we consider just modern linguistics, we encounter
cases of the same linguist analysing the same structure in simpler and
more complex ways (see further Bulté andHousen, 2012). Mazziotta
(2019) and Joseph (forthcoming) examine Lucien Tesnière’s analysis
of the same sentence in 1934 and again two decades later.10 The
earlier version treats the sentence as a ‘solar system’with a verb at its
centre; every word apart from that key verb is joined to one other
word, by a single or double arrow. In his later analysis of this
sentence, what we find is considerably more elaborate, with no
arrows but single, double and dotted lines, straight or curved,
sometimes multiple and with other symbols added indicating
types of relationships. The reason for the changes is not given
and is not easily deduced. The later work is aimed at explaining the
syntactic structure of a range of languages; this in itself would not
have required giving up the solar model, but the shift of purpose
away from the syntax of French alone was a complexification that
coincided with the complexifying of Tesnière’s linguistic description.
This was happening not long before Noam Chomsky was
independently developing his own version of syntactic trees,
which have certain features in common with both of Tesnière’s
models – notably, Chomsky is closer to Tesnière (1934) in not
depicting different types of syntactic relationships using graphically
different lines. The evolution of a given linguist’s analysis and
description over time does not necessarily represent progress,
such that his or her last work must be treated as definitive.
In addition to the etic-emic debate, linguistics in the mid-20th
century featured another controversy, treated memorably by
Householder (1952), between the ‘God’s truth’ and ‘hocus-pocus’
positions.11 Essentially the question was whether linguists discover
linguistic structure or invent it. Most linguists want to position what
they do as science, and their work as discovery – which raises
epistemological issues that are sometimes confronted, but more
often ignored on the grounds that taking them seriously would
make any practical work impossible. Indeed, in every science,
epistemological questions are acknowledged but kept to the
margins, so that ‘normal science’, in Kuhn’s (1962) term, can be
pursued. Yet with some scientific endeavours it is particularly difficult
to keep such questions at bay, and language complexity is one of those
endeavours. It involves multiple levels of analysis, at each of which
difficult issues have been set aside and a form of idealisation produced.
When one starts comparing these idealisations for the purpose of
measuring their relative simplicity and complexity, what has been
repressed tends to return in the form of seepage through the cracks,
whether it has to dowith how the data were gathered, how the analysis
was conducted, how the description was composed, or how simplicity
and complexity are conceived in terms of language form and function.
CONSTITUTIVE AND REGULATIVE RULES
The birth pangs of modern academic linguistics in the mid-19th
century included a debate as to whether it was a natural or
historical science. This can be understood as one version of what
Bruno Latour (1991) has characterised as the ‘constitution’ of
modern thought, based on a polarisation of Nature and Subject/
Society. In the subsequent decades the debate over linguistics was
settled on the side of Nature, and it has been toward that pole that
linguists have striven to locate their work; but as Latour argues,
the polarisation is not actually possible, and modern thought,
however much it may strive for a purified existence at one or the
other pole, always ends up being located somewhere in
the intermediate space of ‘hybrids’ (see Joseph, 2018). With
the study of language that is not difficult to show, since, as an
aspect of human behaviour, there must be some space left for the
individual and social dimension if it is studied as a natural
phenomenon; and some space for the natural dimension if
framing it as a phenomenon of Subject and Society.
Fundamental to modern linguistics is the concept of the language
system, with its sub-systems of at least phonology, morphology and
syntax, which are ‘closed’ systems, along with lexicon and perhaps
other systems (semantics, pragmatics, higher discourse levels) which
are ‘open’ in the sense that they are not expected to have a relatively
small number of elements or to be resistant to taking on new ones.
The language system is understood as being shared by those who
speak the language as their mother tongue; second-language
speakers and multilinguals pose problems that are left to a
specialised sub-field, and not generally called into evidence in
analysing the language. Because of the readily observable fact that
even mother-tongue speakers of ‘the same language’ differ in how
they speak, there needs to be somemeans of accounting for this, such
as positing a domain of ‘speech’ that is individual, and that represents
what is produced using the shared language system, much as the
same violin will produce different sounds depending on who is
playing it. This is a flawed analogy, obviously, because the violin is a
physical object, the sameness of which is directly observable as it is
passed from player to player, whereas the language system is not
10Tesnière (1934) is signed 17 Sep. 1933. Tesnière (1959) was published
posthumously. The sentence in question is: ‘De même qu’on voit un grand
fleuve qui retient encore, coulant dans la plaine, cette force violente et
impétueuse qu’il avait acquise aux montagnes d’où il tire son origine: ainsi
cette vertu céleste, qui est contenue dans les écrits de saint Paul, même dans
cette simplicité de style conserve toute la vigueur qu’elle apporte du ciel, d’où elle
descend’ (Bossuet, Panégyrique de saint Paul), with conserve being the key verb.
11AlthoughHouseholder’s light-hearted discussion appears to be the first published
reference to what he calls these ‘two extreme positions’ regarding ‘the metaphysics
of linguistics’, he indicates that the terms were already in use amongst linguists.
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directly observable: its shape has to be deduced from the observable
speech of individuals, in a process that requires distinguishing which
features are idiosyncratic from those that are generally shared.
This is an inherently normative process, in the sense that it involves
decidingwhat is normal, and so can be ascribed to the language system,
and what is individual, whether it is a regular feature of a given
speaker’s idiosyncratic usage or a one-off use in a particular context. All
such individual features will be analysed as aspects of speech, parole, as
opposed to being built into langue, the socially-shared language system.
Linguists however are resistant to accepting that there is a
normative dimension to this process. In the first year of studying
linguistics, one is presented with the doctrine that linguistics is
descriptive, in contrast to the prescriptive approaches to language
which are dominant outside linguistics. Prescriptive judgments (such
as he don’t is wrong, and he doesn’t is right, despite the former’s great
frequency) are clearly normative. Being on the descriptive side of the
dichotomy, and rejecting prescriptive judgments as anti-scientific,
leads linguists to assume that we are immune to any normative
judgment, and not just to the particularly egregious normativity
represented by prescriptions of what is good and bad usage.
This resistance by linguists has not always been unanimous. Garvin
(1954: 81-82) points out that when Hjelmslev (1953) introduces his
distinction between obligatory and facultative dominance, he ‘avoids
giving a “real” definition which for “concepts like facultative and
obligatory would necessarily presuppose a concept of sociological
norm, which proves [in Hjelmslev’s view] to be dispensable
throughout linguistic theory”’. Garvin contests the supposed
dispensability: ‘Most American linguists have accepted as one of
their basic assumptions the statement that language is part of
culture;12 this implies some assumption of a “sociological norm” –
“cultural”would probably be the preferred adjective – determining the
habit patternwhich constitutes or underlies speech behavior’. Referring
to Garvin (1953), he argues that ‘linguistic structure can be
considered a set of “social norms” in the sense in which the
social psychologists use the term; as far as I can see, H form
[Garvin’s formula for ‘form understood in Hjelmslev’s sense’] is
quite analogous to “structure” in this sense, and hence the
equation H form  “social norm” is not impossible’.
Determiningwhat is normal and systematic is not normative in the
same way as is maintaining what is good and bad; the value judgment
is of a different order. But identifying the normal is still a normative
value judgment, and it runs throughout the conception of a language
system. It is a tenet of generative linguistics that ‘ungrammatical’
sentences are ones which native speakers of English do not produce
(unless as a performance error) and which they reject as not English
when they hear them; as opposed to ‘ungrammatical’ sentences in the
prescriptive sense, which are ones that native speakers do produce
regularly, but which violate rules laid down in grammars of English as
to what is correct and incorrect. And yet some of the utterances which
were declared ungrammatical in early generative work are accepted as
grammatical in later work, even by the same linguist (see Joseph, 2020
on Chomsky’s treatment of performing leisure inHill, 1962; Chomsky,
2008), with no claim made that the language system has changed in
the interim.
The intractability of assessing simplicity and complexity points to
a problematic reductivism in how linguists dichotomise the way a
language system is constituted and functions. In his restatement of
Kant’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules, Searle
(1969: 55) writes: ‘Regulative rules regulate activities whose existence
is independent of the rules; constitutive rules constitute (and also
regulate) forms of activity whose existence is logically dependent on
the rules’. Pullum (2006) applies Searle’s distinction to the one made
by linguists between prescriptivism (which Pullum classes as
regulative) and descriptivism (which he classes as constitutive): ‘I
begin by taking it for granted that there are conditions we might call
correctness conditions for natural languages. [. . .] They are
constitutive, not regulative’. In saying this Pullum captures an
insight that is by nomeans peculiar to him, but characterisesmodern
linguistics generally: that the grammar of a language consists of rules
that determine what is and is not a grammatical utterance in the
language, where grammatical is not a value judgment (which would
make it regulative) but an observation of a quasi-natural constitutive
fact about what the language does and does not allow.
The reductivism lies in the erasure of what Searle recognises in
inserting the parenthesis ‘(and also regulate)’, viz. that the distinction
between constitutive/descriptive rules on the one hand, and
regulative/prescriptive rules on the other, is not the absolute one
which linguists take it to be, but is deceptively weak. This has knock-
on effects for research into complexity: the systems being compared
are unavailable for direct examination; they are inferred from
language use, based on a distinction of grammatical and
ungrammatical utterances which is asserted dogmatically to be
purely constitutive/descriptive, but where judgments of
grammaticality are, as suggested by Searle, also regulative, and
where prescriptive rules are not necessarily unconstitutive.
If complexity is being measured in terms of what is required to
produce grammatical utterances in the judgment of native
speakers, that is very different from what is required to produce
comprehensible utterances. Linguists are rarely interested in totally
incomprehensible utterances; even in the case of a neurolinguistic
analysis of aphasic speech done with therapeutic aims, there needs to
be some comprehension of what the patient is ‘trying to say’, in order
towork outwhat ismaking an utterance ungrammatical. Anyonewho
interacts regularly with non-native speakers of a language will have
experienced linguistic features which make an utterance ‘non-native’
without necessarily making it incomprehensible. There is a gap
between ‘how we say it’ and what we can understand, at every
level from phonetics to discourse. Linguistics conceives of each
speaker’s mental grammar as being the system which generates
that speaker’s production of language, enables their comprehension
of the language, and also enables them to recognise what is ‘deviant’, to
use a term from an earlier phase of Chomskyan analysis. It is
recognised that speakers’ mental grammars vary from one another,
when it comes to production and recognition of deviance, but less
attention has gone to the implications of comprehension. Ifmymental
grammar, my knowledge of a language, is what enables me to
understand utterances in that language, it must be expansive
enough to account for all the forms that I can comprehend, even
if I never produce them.
12Garvin here inserts the footnote ‘Most emphatically Hockett [1950]’. Arguments
of a parallel nature appear in Coseriu (1958).
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The measurement of linguistic complexity follows linguistics
generally in conceiving of grammar in that narrower way which is
based on production, plus recognition of deviance, rather than the full
range of what speakers can comprehend. The purposes for which
linguistic analysis has traditionally been undertaken probably demand
this narrow conception, although the spread of machine
comprehension may be changing this. Work in this area has
moved toward Bayesian analysis of large-scale production corpora,
incorporating ‘feature engineering’ and ‘deep learning’ to extract
grammatical structure, still based on production, though
significantly less subject to normative reduction. We are in the
early stages of understanding whether such research will
revolutionize the measurement of complexity, or render it
meaningless, or simply fail to apply to it. The narrow conception
of grammar has survived decades of onslaught from various
directions; part of its appeal, and hence of its strength, is its
seemingly direct applicability to areas of language research that
desperatelywant grammar to be systematic in a relatively simple form.
Bayesian analysis does not help us to understand what it is that
we should measure when, for example, we want to quantify the
complexity of number-noun gender agreement in Arabic.
Numbers and nouns are both inflected for gender. With the
numbers one and two, the number and noun match in gender.
With the numbers three to ten there is ‘reverse agreement’: if the
noun is masculine, the feminine form of the number is used, and
if the noun is feminine, the masculine form of the number is used;
and in either case the number is followed by the noun in its
indefinite genitive plural form. From 11 to 19 the numbers have
the form one-ten, two-ten, three-ten etc.; for 11 (one-ten) and 12
(two-ten), both the first element (one/two) and the second (ten)
agree in gender with the noun.13 But from 13 (three-ten) to 19
(nine-ten), the second element agrees in gender with the noun,
but the first element has reverse agreement. 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70,
80 and 90 have the same form regardless of the gender of the
noun. In 21 (one-twenty) and 22 (two-twenty), 31 and 32 etc. the
first element agrees in gender with the noun, whilst the second
element remains invariable. With 23 (three-twenty) to 29, 33 to
39 etc., the first element has reverse agreement with the noun, and
the second element is again invariable.
This is the sort of structure that disperses adult learners of
Arabic as a second language into a wide gamut of abilities, from
those who never get it wrong to those who totally ignore it, yet are
generally understood and so perhaps see no need to learn it. For
many mother tongue speakers of Arabic, correct grammar is a
cultural, even a religious duty. In both cases, normative judgments
will be passed upon those who speak and write the language. There
is no clear dividing line except for what is laid down in the rules of
Classical Arabic grammar. So if you want to gauge the complexity
of Arabic morphology, what is it that you will measure? The
grammar of an educated native speaker? An average native
speaker? A competent speaker? An understood speaker?
Whether the analysis is arrived at by a linguist or a computer
programmed for deep learning, these questions – these normative
questions – have to be answered, and actually a good linguist will be
better at that than the most powerful computer would be.
CONCLUSION
If we follow Jakobson’s (1959) dictum that ‘the true difference between
languages is not in what may or may not be expressed but in what
must ormust not be conveyed by the speakers’, it comes down to how
to determine the must. Must, or else what? If the answer isn’t ‘or else
incomprehension by the hearer’, then it lies somewhere in the realm of
the normative. Not in a clearly defined normative location either, but
something like a blurred and shifting field of vision where one eye is
gazing through the normativity of the language community, and the
other eye through the normativity of the linguistics community in its
analytical choices. The two eyes rarely if ever focus on the same object.
Tomakematters worse, linguists are in denial about their normativity:
in Peircean semiotic terms, the language systems which we attempt to
measure for complexity are icons, representations by human hands,
whichwe pretend are indices, reproducing their objects throughdirect,
natural means. Linguistic analysis is run through with interpretation –
but to say that threatens the image of linguistics as an objective
science.14 Ultimately, that image is the obstacle to measuring the
complexity of languages, because it prevents linguists fromdoingwhat
is needed to make the measurement solid and meaningful:
confronting the normative, interpretative dimension of both what
we want to measure and how we want to measure it. Only by
understanding that dimension can we hope to bring it under
control in a way that would allow for its elimination as a variable
in the comparative analysis of language systems, which systems would
themselves need to be reconceived in a way that embodies a
consistency that would make genuine comparison possible, and the
measurement of linguistic complexity less intractable.
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